Abstract-Against the problems emerged in protocols presented by N. Modadugu, D.Bonch and M. Kim I1l, news serveraided public key generation protocols on low-power devices are proposed in this paper. The protocols are secure against some passive attacks, such as "collusion attack" and "the third party attack". In Kim [1] resolved the problem by presenting two-server-aided RSA key generation protocols. which we call "MIBK". Using the MK protocols, users can quickly generate an RSA key on a low-power device with the help of un-trsted servers in such a way that once the key is generated the server should not get an information about the key it helped generation. However, one drawback of the MBK protocols is that two servers involved in generation of RSA key must not share information with each other. Otherwise, they can easily acquire die user's secret key from share information as noted in [1] .
aided public key generation protocols on low-power devices are proposed in this paper. The protocols are secure against some passive attacks, such as "collusion attack" and "the third party attack". In addition, efficiency of primality test on low-power devices in reference [1] is improved in this paper. Prospective applications of the protocols would be found in mobile ecommence, mobile Ad-hoc, and military communications.
I. INTRODCTJION
As a new application for in-vehicle entertainiment, MP3 players have begun to make an entrance into the vehicle market. Connections compatible with suchlike devices (MP3) have been available on BMW, Nissan, Volvo, and so on. The logical extension of this trend is in-vehicle hard drivers and wireless local area networks (WLANs), which would permit the information exchange among home, office and vehicle via wireless connections the storage and transfer of every sort of computer files such as databases, documents, music files, video files, and entertainments. Consumers would not drive to a video store to rent a movie, but would merely download the movie file via wireless connection from a convenient location-perhaps a metro station-and also pay in mobile devices such as mobile set, PDA, and other handheld devices, via the wireless connection. Most of these applications require secure [1] resolved the problem by presenting two-server-aided RSA key generation protocols. which we call "MIBK". Using the MK protocols, users can quickly generate an RSA key on a low-power device with the help of un-trsted servers in such a way that once the key is generated the server should not get an information about the key it helped generation. However, one drawback of the MBK protocols is that two servers involved in generation of RSA key must not share information with each other. Otherwise, they can easily acquire die user's secret key from share information as noted in [1] .
In this paper, we present new version of the MBK protocols that resists a "collusion attack"' in which the two servers in the server-aided public key generion collude to shlae information. Our protocols can also protect the low-power device users from "the third party ttack" in which an eavesdropper hijacks all of the infonnation of the user. We take RSA for example buit not while composites will fail with overwhelming probability).
2) Compute Ny pq.
3) Pick encryption and decryption exponents eoand d(bsuch that ed -1 (mod y(V)) 3 where (0(N) = (p -1)(q -1) (Note that (0 <denotes the Euler function).
In the above algorithm, the most resource-consuming operations occur in Step l(c), which is the primality testing part. Compared with 1(c), computational overhead for conducting Step 2 and Step 3 are small. We remark that when RSA cryptosystem is uised to encrypt a short session key (for a smmetry encryption scheme), which is shorter than the bitlength of p, one can use the "unbalanced RSA", firstly considered by Shamir [3] . In his unbalanced RSA, the encryption and decryption exponent c< and do satisfy ed 1 mod (p -1)) and the size of a prime factor qomis approximately 10 times larger than the other prime factor p.
Shamir [3] noted that the key generation of the standard RSA can be sped up 'm the unbalanced version without extra tine complexity. In [1] , N. Modadugu et al. present a -variant of the unbalanced RSA xvhere a modulus is a product of a prime and a certain size of random number. It is evident that in this variant, the computations in Step 1(c) can be greatly reduced due to the fact that only one prime needs to be generated. (As a result, the RSA key generation in [2] can be sped up ftther).
III. THE MBK PROTOCOLS
In this section we review the MBK protocols for standard and unbalanced RSA key generation. B. UnbalancedRSA key neration So-called unbalanced RSA mneans that RSA modulus is a product of a prune p and a random nwnber or a longer prime which is 8-10 limes long as the prime p in bits.
The main idea of the MBK protocol for unbalanced RSA is similar to that for standard RSA. The differences ae: (a) Low-power device divides (p-i) (not )into two parts such that t + t2 = p -1 (b) The low-power device checks if X1 -+X2 (mod p) (The modulus is not N).
In the above protocol, the total ruining tune is reduced by a factor of 5 [1] length, and none of them is divisible by small primes.
2) Low-power device computes N pq and 9(N) N-pq+1, where ( N) is j'ust a caindidate, not an Euler number.
Then pick a random g E ZA such that g is not a multiple ofp or q.
3) Low-power device picks random integers ti , t, and t2,r t2 in(NAt) suchi tat t +t1 t +t1 4) 
The current problem is whether or not Eqation (10) holds when Equation (12) is true?
Let j a -1 (mod (p -1)) 3 consider precondition gcd(a, y(N)) 1, and raise both sides of Equation (11) (7) will fail with os erwhelmmg probability. Consequently, Equations (12) and (15) will fail with overwhelming probability.
B. Unbalanced RSA ke generation protocol swcure against passive atttck We describe the unbalanced RSA key generation protocol against passive attack as follows 1) Low-power device generates a 512-bit candidate p such that p _ 3(mod 4) and p is not divisible by small primes and a random number R that is 8-10 limes long as p in bits, usually 4096 6) Low-power device locally runs a probabilistic primality test to verify that p is a prime.
In this version, the total runing time is reduced by a factor of 5 [4] . It is xworth noticing that untbalanced RSA is only suitable for the case that message is shorter than p. Besides, the version canot be used for signatures. C Scuriy ana{vsis Analysis in [1] showed that the un-trusted servers learnt no useful information about RSA private key whether from the rejected candidates or from the finial public key if only server 1 did not collude with server 2. So is the case im our protocols. In addition, the holder of a low-power device need not worry about eavesdroppi on network from the thfird party.
While using the MBK protocols, we must make special protection measure between low-power device and server in order to protect an eavesdropper from overhearing. However, large amount of work are added to server 1 and 2, the length of exponent dominates the speed of key generation. Ih NBK protocols, exponents t, andt are similar length to y(N) while s1 and s2 are much longer than 4 that of (0(N) in the new protocol, the maximlum length can reach nearly two times of (0(N)'s. that may slow down the work=mg speed one multiple [2] . In other words, we acquire securit key generaton in the cost of working speed of the servers. Nevertheless it is still much faster than local generation on low-power device according to reference [4] .
Of course, we should take notice when we chose paraineters of unbalanced RSA key [3] .
We take RSA for example of server-aided key generation on lov-power device, but not 
